BBVA’s arms investments
El BBVA apoya a través de diversos productos financieros a empresas de armas que producen bombas, explosivos, misiles, armas nucleares y de uranio empobrecido, entre otros.
Inversiones del BBVA en armamento:
1) Créditos y préstamos 2011-2015: 2.778.586.099 €
2) Emisión de bonos y pagarés 2011-2015: 353.363.228 €
3) Fondos de inversión, acciones y bonos 2011-2015: 6.154.879 €
4) Financiación de exportaciones de armamento italiano 2011-2014: 24.446.968 €
Inversiones totales en armas del BBVA 2011-2015: 3.162.551.174,35 €
Créditos y préstamos 2011-2015.
|
Créditos y préstamos |
||
|
AECOM AECOM Technology |
11-ago-14 |
17.937.220 |
|
AECOM AECOM Technology |
11-ago-14 |
69.058.296 |
|
AECOM AECOM Technology |
11-ago-14 |
52.914.798 |
|
AECOM AECOM Technology |
07-jun-13 |
17.937.220 |
|
AECOM AECOM Technology |
23-sep-11 |
35.874.439 |
|
AECOM AECOM Technology |
29-ene-14 |
34.977.578 |
|
AECOM AECOM Technology |
13-jul-11 |
62.780.269 |
|
Airbus Group EADS |
14-mar-11 |
146.188.341 |
|
Airbus Group EADS |
14-oct-14 |
120.179.372 |
|
Babcock & Wilcox The Babcock & Wilcox Co |
22-may-12 |
28.699.552 |
|
Babcock & Wilcox The Babcock & Wilcox Co |
11-may-15 |
32.286.996 |
|
Boeing Boeing Co |
05-nov-11 |
37.668.161 |
|
Boeing Boeing Co |
29-sep-12 |
412.556.054 |
|
Boeing Boeing Co |
29-sep-12 |
412.556.054 |
|
Boeing Boeing Co |
23-sep-14 |
44.843.049 |
|
Boeing Boeing Co |
23-sep-14 |
44.843.049 |
|
Finmeccanica Finmeccanica SpA |
09-jul-14 |
89.686.099 |
|
Finmeccanica Finmeccanica SpA |
28-jul-10 |
76.233.184 |
|
Finmeccanica Finmeccanica SpA |
06-jul-15 |
80.717.489 |
|
General Dynamics General Dynamics Corp |
21-jun-13 |
112.107.623 |
|
General Dynamics General Dynamics Corp |
14-jul-11 |
71.748.879 |
|
Honeywell International Honeywell International Inc |
17-mar-11 |
55.605.381 |
|
Honeywell International Honeywell International Inc |
30-mar-12 |
115.695.067 |
|
Honeywell International Honeywell International Inc |
18-nov-13 |
65.470.852 |
|
Jacobs Engineering |
05-mar-15 |
49.327.354 |
|
Jacobs Engineering |
05-mar-15 |
122.869.955 |
|
Thales |
17-dic-10 |
78.923.767 |
|
Maxam |
15-dic-11 |
10.000.000 |
|
Maxam |
27-dic-12 |
4.600.000 |
|
Maxam |
27-dic-12 |
5.700.000 |
|
Maxam |
27-dic-12 |
12.200.000 |
|
Maxam |
29-jul-14 |
18.900.000 |
|
Maxam |
29-jul-14 |
66.100.000 |
|
Maxam |
29-jul-15 |
19.300.000 |
|
Maxam |
29-jul-15 |
67.500.000 |
|
Navantia |
18-mar-15 |
81.800.000 |
|
Oesia |
29-oct-15 |
500.000 |
|
Sener |
25-mar-11 |
600.000 |
|
Sener |
25-mar-11 |
1.700.000 |
|
Total |
2.778.586.099 |
Emisión de bonos y pagarés 2011-2015
|
Emisión de bonos y pagarés |
||
|
AECOM AECOM Technology Corp |
17-sep-14 |
71.748.879 |
|
AECOM AECOM Technology Corp |
17-sep-14 |
71.748.879 |
|
Airbus Group |
20-oct-14 |
57.399.103 |
|
Boeing Boeing Capital Corp |
28-oct-14 |
8.071.749 |
|
Boeing Boeing Capital Corp |
28-oct-14 |
8.071.749 |
|
Boeing Boeing Capital Corp |
28-oct-14 |
16.143.498 |
|
Boeing Boeing Capital Corp |
18-feb-15 |
5.381.166 |
|
Boeing Boeing Capital Corp |
18-feb-15 |
7.174.888 |
|
Boeing Boeing Capital Corp |
18-feb-15 |
7.174.888 |
|
Finmeccanica Finmeccanica Finance SA |
17-ene-14 |
17.937.220 |
|
Finmeccanica Finmeccanica Finance SA |
26-nov-13 |
52.914.798 |
|
Honeywell International Honeywell International Inc |
18-nov-13 |
8.968.610 |
|
Honeywell International Honeywell International Inc |
18-nov-13 |
20.627.803 |
|
Total |
353.363.229 |
|
Fondos de inversión, acciones y bonos 2011-2015
|
Fondos de inversión, acciones y bonos |
||
|
EADS |
30-Jun-2011 |
110.538 € |
|
SANTA BÁRBARA (GENERAL DYNAMICS) |
31-oct-11 |
144.341 € |
|
Indra |
31-oct-15 |
4.900.000 € |
|
Indra |
31-ago-15 |
1.000.000 € |
|
Total |
6.154.879 € |
|
Financiación de exportaciones de armamento italiano 2011-2014
|
Financiación de exportaciones de armamento italiano |
||
|
2011 |
6.410.004 € |
|
|
2012 |
11.617.885 € |
|
|
2013 |
2.209.998 € |
|
|
2014 |
4.209.081 € |
|
|
Total |
24.446.968 € |
|
Inversiones totales en armas del BBVA 2011-2015
|
INVERSIONES TOTALES EN ARMAS DEL BBVA 2011-15 |
Euros |
|
|
Créditos y préstamos |
2.778.586.098,65 |
|
|
Emisión de bonos y pagarés |
353.363.228,70 |
|
|
Fondos de inversión, acciones y bonos |
6.154.879 |
|
|
Exportaciones de armamento italiano |
24.446.968 |
|
|
Total |
3.162.551.174,35€ |
Las empresas de armamento controvertido que financia el grupo BBVA son:
– Aecom: proveedor global en arquitectura, ingeniería, consultoría, operaciones y mantenimiento de vehículos comerciales y militares, equipo y armas; incluyendo tanques, vehículos de infantería, sistemas de artillería, sistemas de defensa antiaérea, sistemas de radar, sistemas de comunicaciones, vehículos rodados y productos especiales según necesidades.
– BAE Systems: es el segundo mayor contratista militar del mundo además de una constructora aeronáutica comercial. Es el sucesor de gran parte de los más famosos aviones y sistemas de defensa británicos. Fabrica todo tipo de Airbus, así como aviones y carros de combate, vehículos blindados, submarinos y destructores antiaéreos.
– Babcock & Wilcox: es una multinacional estadounidense que se ocupa del diseño, ingeniería, manufactura, servicio y construcción de equipos de generación de energía eléctrica y sistemas de control de la contaminación para servicios públicos e industrias. Vinculación a la energía nuclear, submarinos nucleares (fabricó componentes para el USS Nautilus) y construcción de reactores nucleares para diversas plantas.
– Bechtel: es la mayor compañía de ingeniería de los EE.UU. y ha participado en la construcción de Presa Hoover, el Eurotúnel, diversas plantas de energía nuclear, etc. Entre sus proyectos cabe destacar el Complejo de seguridad nacional Y-12 para armas nucleares y almacenamiento de uranio enriquecido en Oak Ridge, en Tennesse.
– Boeing: es el segundo mayor fabricante de aviones (tanto cazas como bombarderos, como el avión F-18 del Ejército del Aire) y equipos aeroespaciales del mundo. Además diseña y fabrica helicópteros, sistemas electrónicos y de defensa, misiles (ha participado en el desarrollo y producción de los misiles nucleares Minuteman), satélites, vehículos de lanzamiento y sistemas avanzados de comunicación e información.
– EADS: fabrica aviones de combate, aeronaves, helicópteros y misiles militares especialmente para las Fuerzas Armadas francesas (86% de producción militar).
– Finmeccanica: es el segundo grupo industrial italiano. Fabrica aviones de transporte táctico completos, aviones de combate y vehículos aéreos no tripulados para aplicaciones militares. Desarrollo y producción de sistemas de misiles (incluidos los nucleares), torpedos de artillería naval y vehículos blindados.
– General Dynamics: empresa estadounidense fabricante de blindaje, camiones, cañones, armas ligeras, bombas, submarinos nucleares y sistemas de guía de misiles nucleares (100% en producción militar).
– Honeywell International: multinacional norteamericana dedicada a unidades aeroespaciales, soluciones de control y automoción, sistemas de transporte y materiales especializados, además del mantenimiento de armas nucleares como la Trident II.
– Indra: empresa dedicada a electrónica militar, simuladores de vuelo, sistemas de tiro y defensa electrónica. Producción del Eurofighter, fragatas F-100 y helicópteros Tigre (27% de producción militar).
– ITT Corporation: manufacturera global con programas espaciales de aeronáutica militar y comercial. Comunicación e integración de sistemas de comunicación.
– Jacob Engineering Group: empresa internacional de ingeniería, arquitectura y construcción. Los principales mercados de la empresa son energía, químicos y polímeros, infraestructura, minería y metales, petróleo y gas, y refinamiento. Está especializada en consultoría científica, instalaciones técnicas y de mantenimiento de todo tipo de equipamiento aeroespacial y de defensa.
– Larsen & Toubro: multinacional india más importante de su país dedicada a ingeniería, construcción, manufactura de materias primas, tecnología de la información y servicios financieros. Expertos en diseño y cualificación sísmica de bombas, sistemas de defensa electrónicos comunicación militar, simuladores para equipo militar y guerra electrónica.
– Lockheed Martin: es una de las mayores multinacionales fabricantes de armas del mundo. Fabricación de aviones, vehículos terrestres, misiles nucleares y armas guiadas, misiles de defensa, sistemas navales, sistemas de radar y satélites.
– MAXAM: empresa española fabricante de todo tipo de explosivos civiles y militares (explosivos de uso civil; cartuchos y pólvora de uso deportivo; artículos y servicios para la industria de defensa; materias primas en nitro química) a través de sus filiales Expal y Faex.
– McDermott: compañía norteamericana que ofrece servicios de ingeniería y construcción. También proporciona sistemas submarinos, conducciones e instalaciones de producciones fijas y flotantes. Explotación y gestión de laboratorios de armas nucleares además del suministro de componentes nucleares. Fue miembro integrante del consorcio que desarrolló las bombas nucleares de Nagasaki e Hiroshima.
– Northrop Grumman: es el tercer mayor contratista de defensa militar de EE.UU.. Proporciona productos, servicios y soluciones para los sectores aeroespaciales, electrónico, sistemas de información y construcción naval. Producción y mantenimiento de misiles nucleares.
– Raytheon: empresa especializada en mercados de defensa y seguridad nacional. Ofrece servicios de electrónica, integración de sistemas para misiones, sistemas de inteligencia, comunicaciones y control. Producción de misiles de defensa, de guerra y nucleares.
– Rolls-Royce: grupo de compañías derivadas de la británica y aeronáutica que en 1906 fundaron Charles Stewart Rolls y Henry Royce. Fabrican motores de aeronaves y turbinas navales; así como sistemas de alimentación integrados para el uso por tierra, mar y aire. También desarrollan submarinos nucleares para la marina británica.
– Textron: conglomerado de empresas estadounidense especializado en el sector aeroespacial y de defensa. Produce munición de racimo y es el único fabricante estadounidense que produce minas anti-persona.
– Thales: compañía francesa de electrónica dedicada al desarrollo de sistemas de información y servicios para los mercados aeroespacial, de defensa y seguridad a partir de equipos y componentes de telecomunicaciones en satélites y aviones no tripulados. Aunque en España la filial está asociada a sistemas y equipos de seguridad ferroviaria, es la novena contratista de defensa más grande del mundo (63% de producción militar).
Fuentes:
– “Negocios sucios. Bancos españoles que financian armas” (2011) Setem.
– Instituti di Credito, Italia 2010.
– Informe Alerta 2009, Alerta 2006, Alerta 2005. Escola cultura de pau.
– Base de datos SABI, consultado en marzo de 2011.
– Base de datos CNMV, consultado en marzo de 2011.
– Base de datos E informa, consultado en julio de 2011.
– “Worlwide Invesments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsability”. Roos Boer,Suzanne Oosterwijk, Stijn Suijs, Esther Vandenbroucke. Junio 2012. IKV Pax Christi, the Netherlands and FairFin.
– “Don’t Bank on the Bomb: a Global Report on the Financing of Nuclear Weapons Producers”. Susi Snyder y Wilbert van der Zeijden. Octubre 2013. IKV Pax Christi, ICAN, Profundo.
Other controversial BBVA investments
BBVA invests again in the controversial Camisea Gas Project in Peru
As the report “Exigint responsabilitat al Banc Interamericà de Desenvolupament (BID) i la Corporació Financera Internacional (CFI) en Camisea II” (Demanding responsibility of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in Camisea II) already warned in September 2007, these institutions have provided 1.1 million dollars for Camisea II, the extension of the controversial natural gas project called Camisea to new areas of tropical rainforest in the Peruvian Amazon.
BBVA financed Camisea I amidst strong criticism
The IDB granted loans in 2002 and 2003 (60 million dollars through its private sector department) to Camisea I amidst strong criticism both national and international due to the fact that Lot 88 of the Peruvian Amazon was considered a critical area by environmental experts. Consequences: hasty and imperfect construction of the pipeline causing erosion of the earth and six breakages. After the sixth breakage in 2006, the Peruvian Government and the IDB initiated an audit but refused the petition for it to be independent.
During its time, some private banks like ABN-AMRO and Citigroup refused to participate in the controversial project.
However, despite the environmental and social risks associated with the project, BBVA financed Tecpetrol of Peru in August 2006 with a loan of 35 million dollars, contingent on the right to extract and sell Camisea gas. Tecpetrol, an Argentinean company belonging to the Techint group, is part of the consortium responsible for gas production activities.
In 2006 the Office of the Peruvian Ombudsman concluded that “in the installation of Camisea I the rights of the indigenous communities (to a healthy environment, health, participation in public life, access to information, food and life style) have not been respected…”.
Camisea II will continue with the support of BBVA
On the 24th of June 2008, the governors of the IDB signed in their Washinton headquarters the financing contracts for 800 million dollars for the liquefied natural gas (LNG) exportation project, Camisea, more widely known as Camisea II. This project is situated in Lot 56 and repeates the same problems that Camisea I had in Lot 88 at its beginning in 2004. In previous and current operations rules of the IDB and the IFC themselves have been broken, as well as international regulations of the rights of indigenous peoples, especially those relatied to prior consultation and consent.
The contract is divided into two sections: a loan of 400 million dollars made directly by the IDB and a second loan of 400 million made by a sindicate of seven banks, BBVA among them (SociétéGénérale, Calyon, BBVA, Sumitomo, ING, Mizuho and the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi).
On the other hand, two days later on the 26th of June 2008, the International Financial Corporation (IFC), the financial arm of the World Bank, together with private banks (amongst whom BBVA probably again appeared) signed an agreement, which grants a lon of 300 million dollars to the project. In total, between the IDB and the IFC the financial support adds up to 1.1 billion dollars.
The Consortium ‘Perú LNG’, formed by the North American oil company Hunt Oil, the Spanish Repsol YPF, the Korean SK Corporation and the Japanese Marubeni Corporation is in charge of the Camisea II project. Its total investment reaches 3,800 million dollars and funds the construction of a gas pipeline, a liquefaction plant in Pampa Melchorita (between the valleys of Cañete-Llima and Chincha-Ica), a port terminal to load the gas and accompanying installations.
The IDB’s loan, the largest approved by a private company in Peru by this multilateral financial institution, will have a repayment period of 14 years starting from the date of the completion of construction of the liquefaction plant, officially the 10th of June 2010. The IFC in turn declared “This loan is the IFC’s largest for its Latin American account to date”.
It is worth noting that the Camisea gas project is not only being questioned for its social and ecological impact; its focus on exportation (principally to Mexico and the US) is at odds with the satisfaction of a growing demand from the internal Peruvian market. This has been denounced by several analysts of the hydrocarbon sector who warn that, from a regional perspective, gas will become a scarce energy resource and thus a strategic one. A significant figure: it is estimated that the liquefaction plant in Pampa Melchorita will produce liquid natural gas exports worth 1,000 million dollars annually. In accordance with the estimations of the consortium, this would represent almost 0.8% of Peru’s GDP.
Information sources:
http://www.amazonwatch.org
http://www.weed-online.org/themen/english.html
http://www.aidesep.org.pe
http://www.biceca.org/és/index.aspx
http://www.elcomercio.com.pe
http://www.banktrack.org
http://www.finanzaseticas.org
The heavy crude oil pipeline in Ecuador.
The heavy crude oil pipeline in Ecuador has come under severe criticism on account of its negative impact on Ecuador’s ecosystems which in turn is causing the displacement of communities to unpolluted areas. Among the impacts are the destruction of six active volcanos, a large number of reserves of fresh water and virgin rainforest, as well as a major risk of environmental accidents. In 2000, the Ecuadorean government granted a concession to the OCP Consortium (made up of five Ecuadorean petroleum companies active in the Amazon region.) for the construction, management and control of the pipeline over a period of twenty years. The pipeline was built by OCP Ecuador, S. A., a subsidiary of OCP Ltd. The total cost of the project was estimated at 1.300 million dollars and daily output at about 220,000 barrels. Financing was basically through a syndicated seventeen-year, US$900-million loan ending in July 2018 with the remaining $400 million covered by OCP Ltd.’s capital. In July 2001 OCP and sixteen banking institutions from eight countries led by the Westdeutsche Landesbank of Germany signed a loan agreement. Nine banks were involved in the syndicated loan which provided 590 millions dollars, of which BBVA contributed 150 million.
Before providing the money, the banks introduced guarantees and risk-reducing mechanisms so that they would recover their money even if the project were to die. The main condition was that each oil company that used the pipeline would have to sign a contract with OCP Ltd. specifying the volume of crude it wanted to transport and the amount it would pay for the volume contracted regardless of whether it was in fact ever transported. Such contracts are pillars of the financial structure and reduce the risks to one: that one or more of the oil companies could go bankrupt (Encan, Occidental, AGIP, and Repsol-YPF are considered blue-chip firms involving minimal risk.)
Sources:
- Profundo, “ The financing of the OCP pipeline in Ecuador”. (www.profundo.nl/publicaties/ocp.html)
- AID Environment
- Campaña Internactional contra OCP (which among other organisations includes Acción Ecológica of Ecuador, Ungewald of Germany, Amazon Watch of the United States, Repsol Mata of Catalonia, ODG, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Carovana Internazionale de Solidarità of Italy have likewise been critical of the project.)
The ENCE cellulose factory in Uruguay
In the Uruguayan city of Fray Bentos located on the eastern bank of the Uruguay River and adjacent to the Argentine province of Entre Rios, the Uruguayan government has authorised the Finnish company Botnia and the Spanish company ENCE to construct two cellulose-production plants. This has produced a diplomatic conflict between Argentina and Uruguay given the opposition by the residents of the Argentine towns of Gualeguaychu and Colon located on the opposite bank of the river to the impact the pollution involved would have on their health and. livelihoods. As this represented a violation of the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies, as confirmed by the World Bank compliance advisor ombudsman Meg Taylor and as the investment was negotiated, this violates the Uruguay River Treaty and consequently the World Bank’s International Waters Safeguards. Nevertheless, BBVA gave its support to providing ENCE with the financing it needed for its 50% of the project, assessed at 600 million dollars.
The project is currently on hold even though another ENCE cellulose plant is planned for Conchillas, a rural settlement in the Department of Colonia, at the point where the Uruguay and Parana Rivers converge to form the Rio del Plata estuary. This project will thus most likely go ahead with the same structure as the initial.
Sources (most recently consulted on 7 April 2007):
- http://www.cedha.org.ar/es/iniciativas/celulosa/
- http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/documents/preliminaryassessmentFINAL.pdf
- http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/noticia_9614.asp
Buying of political favours in Latin America
The first investigation into BBVA’s activities was begun by the FBI in 1999 in response to a charge made by Nelson Rodriguez, a former vice-president of the bank’s Puerto Rican subsidiary convicted of embezzlement. He provided substantial evidence related to the bank’s activities some of them in Cuba and links with drug trafficking and embezzlement. In 2001, the Bank of Spain’s legal staff discovered that BBVA had for thirteen years had two secret accounts in Jersey, a tax haven, one in Liechtenstein and another in Switzerland. They totalled 37,343 million pesetas, 3,500 million of which were invested in twenty-two pension funds held by BBVA board members, including the president Emilio Ybarra.
Baltasar Garzón, a Spanish judge, took over the investigation of the matter of the secret account regarding which the Bank of Spain had begun the process of imposing sanctions on BBVA. The basis was a report from the Office of the State Anti-Corruption Prosecutor, alleging that the objective of the scheme which extended beyond the US to Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru was “obtaining majority positions in certain financial institutions in Latin America either by buying political favours or by laundering capital illegally acquired.”
In the end judge Fernando Grande-Maleska, Garzón’s substitute, closed the investigation of the Probursa case in 2001, and in March 2005, the investigation of BBVA for laundering money from drug dealers and paramilitary groups citing “an absolute lack of evidence” and stating that the efforts to that date had “not produced any positive results of an incriminating nature”.
Sources consulted as of 7 April 2007:
- La Vanguardia (the first source to cover the case), various articles
- El Vocero
- El Mundo http://www.elmundo.es/especiales/2002/04/economia/bbva/hechos.html
- América Económica http://www.americaeconomica.com/numeros3/157/reportajes/rafa157.htm
- El País http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia…
Mexico: Mexico: In Mexico, the Prosecutor’s Office has accused BBVA of money-laundering operations aimed at gaining control over the Mexican bank Probursa. For this operation, BBVA created a subsidiary in Puerto Rico, a country with less transparency than many others, named BBV IIC which operated through unguaranteed loans. Participating in the operation were the president of Probursa, José Madariaga, and his right-hand man Eduardo Pérez Montoya, considered by the FBI to belong to the drug-trafficking world, who helped BBV gain majority control in exchange for laundering funds deposited on Grand Cayman..
Source checked 4 July 2007:
Venezuela: For Hugo Chavez’ election campaign, BBV of Jersey deposited 1 million dollars on 7 July 1999 in the name of Convertine Nyoffshore, a company registered in Caracas on 12 May 1997 with capital of $US 30,000. The accounts of Banco Provincial BBV show a company called Micabu transferred thousands to Chávez’ election campaign. While contributing to election campaigns is legal in Venezuela, Chávez did not declare the contribution to the Board of Elections (it is not known where the money went) which makes the transaction illegal. How much was received by two conservative opposition parties is also unknown but it has been said that the total far exceeds that received by the party currently in power.
Source consulted 3 April 2007:
Peru: According to Spain’s anti-corruption prosecution service, BBVA, with the aim of obtaining share control of Banco Continental, obtained in 1995 50% of the shares of Banco Continental, equal to the Brescia family, through loans worth 100,000 dollars paid to Panama. These were made as donations (into accounts of the Brescia family) by the BBV International Investment of Puerto Rico as donations to the Fujimori government for the Lima mayoral election campaign of Vladimiro Montesinos.
Source (consulted 3/4/07):
Money laundering
Mexico: laundering money from drug trafficking, the above mentioned case tied to the buying of political favours
Colombia: BBV in July 1996 adquired 35 % of Banco Ganadero. The Fidugan Group held 32%, minority shareholders 33%. In order to gain majority control of the Banco Ganadero, BBV entered into an alliance with the Fidugan Group—the typical collaboration of foreign capital with the local oligarchy. The latter sold the former its share in exchange for laundering large sums of money derived from drug trafficking and extortion by paramilitaries. The mentioned financial mechanism consisted in an operation with two elements both designed to launder money in Panama and Colombia. In the first Marco Aurelio Royo Anaya, alleged by the FBI to be a drug trafficker, placed shares in Banco Ganadero valued at 212 million dollars in the BBV Privanza Switzerland.- In the second, the Puerto Rican subsidiary of BBV, the BBVIIC, gave Panamian front companies owned by Royo four loans totalling about 200 million dollars. Later, BBV made various transfers to front companies Royo created for the purpose.
On the receipts for the transfers the name was amateurishly changed to Rayo, Roy and Roys. In this way, Royo managed to launder cash hidden in Panama and Colombia by cloaking it as routine credits from BBV while breaking them into a series of complex, seemingly unconnected banking operations which involved six countries. BBV in Switzerland—Privanca BBVIIIC Switzerland was to guarantee the two loans through shares in Banco Ganadero owned by Royo, which as mentioned, he was to have placed in Switzerland previously.
Finally the credits given to BBVA’s Colombian partners, which for the most part had been made by the Puerto Rico subsidiary for a period of five years without any real guarantees, were to disappear a few months later from the bank’s books without the debtors’ ever paying a penny. Documents show fund transfers totalling 643 million dollars which would have covered the laundering of some 300 million dollars illegally obtained in Colombia and Panama.
Source (as of 4 July 2007):
- Report by Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office presented to the National Court in October 2000
- Various articles from La Vanguardia and El Vocero